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I. INTRODUCTION
Law and policy restrict women in the United States Military
from serving in positions that would require them to engage in
direct combat.' The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MIrnTARY WOMEN
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19482 excludes women from Air Force and Navy vessels and aircraft
that might engage in combat.3 The Army and the Marine Corps also
exclude women from combat through their official established pol-
icies. 4 The result of these statutes and policies is the exclusion of
women, on the sole basis of gender, from over twelve percent of
the skill positions and thirty-nine percent of the total positions of-
fered by the Department of Defense.5 There has never been a direct
challenge to the constitutionality of these laws and regulations ban-
ning women from combat. The closest the United States Supreme
Court has come to deciding the issue was in Rostker v. Goldberg,6
where the constitutionality of a male-only draft registration was up-
held. The purpose of this Note is to establish reasons that the sta-
tutes and policies excluding women from combat positions should
be repealed by Congress or declared unconstitutional.
Part II explains that there is some question about what standard
of scrutiny would be applied if there is a direct constitutional chal-
lenge to the combat exclusion laws. Part III examines the case of
Rostker v. Goldberg7 and speculates about the effect this case will
have on the standard of scrutiny applied if there is a test of the
constitutionality of the combat exclusion laws. Part IV asserts that
these laws and policies do not meet the standards set forth in Craig
v. Boren.8 Part V reviews the traditional justifications for banning
women from combat and explains why these reasons are no longer
appropriate or acceptable. Part VI proposes additional reasons the
combat exclusion laws should be declared unconstitutional or re-
iN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE v (6th ed. 1988).
There are approximately 230,000 women in the military who together constitute approximately
eleven percent of all military personnel on active duty. Moskos, Army Women, THE ATLANTIC MONTHIY,
Aug. 1990, at 71.
"One in ten Americans in uniform today is a female." 60 Minutes, (CBS television broadcast,
Aug. 26, 1990) (transcripts available from Journal Graphics, Inc., 267 Broadway, New York, NY
10007).
2. 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549 (1988 ed.).
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 1, at v.
4. Id. [Hereinafter "combat exclusion laws" will refer to the entire body of statutes and
officially established policies that exclude women in the military from combat positions.]
5. Id.
6. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 80 (1981).
7. Id.
8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See infra § II.
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pealed. Finally, Part VII concludes that the passage of legislation
calling for an experimental program where women would serve in
combat units would be a substantial step towards the total abolition
of these discriminatory statutes and policies.
II. THE STANDARD OF SCRUTINY TO BE APPLIED IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause insures
that no state can deny any person "the equal protection of the
laws." 9 Although the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause is not applicable to the federal government, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause prohibits the federal government from making unreasonable
classifications.10 Thus, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guar-
antee that people who are similarly situated will be treated similarly
by federal and state government."
Historically, courts have applied two levels of scrutiny to statutes
and policies challenged as being discriminatory. 12 Under the lowest
level of scrutiny the government only has to establish that a clas-
sification used by the statute or policy in question has a mere ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate governmental end. 3 Under strict
scrutiny the statute will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote
.a compelling governmental interest.' 4 In the past few decades, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court appears to have established
a middle level of scrutiny for gender discrimination cases."
The first case in which the Court explicitly rejected' 6 the mere
rationality test for gender discrimination was Frontiero v. Richard-
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
11. L. TRIBE, AmmwcAN CONsnrrONAL LAW 1438 (2nd ed. 1988).
12. G. GUNTHER, CONsnTrsoNAL LAW 588 (11th ed. 1985). Actually, this is an over simpli-
fication of the number of standards of scrutiny that the courts apply in Equal Protection cases. There
have been variations on each of these standards in several opinions.
13. Id. at 586. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
14. G. GUTHER, supra note 12, at 588.
15. Id. at 590.
16. In an earlier case the court purported to apply the mere rationality test, but seemed to be
applying it with more force. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19911
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son.17 In Frontiero a plurality opinion held that gender classifications
should be strictly scrutinized because they are inherently suspect. 18
Since gender, like race, is an immutable characteristic, "statutory
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously
relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members."' 19 The
plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan stated that classifica-
tions based upon sex are inherently objectionable. 20
The Court, however, retreated from applying the strict scrutiny
standard in gender discrimination cases three years later. In Craig
v. Boren,21 the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that forbade
the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of twenty-one
and females under eighteen. 22 Justice Brennan's majority opinion
articulated the standard that was to be applied in gender-based dis-
crimination cases.23 The classification "must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives" and "must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Although the Court was not ex-
plicit in declaring a new intermediate standard of review, Justice
Powell in his concurrence stated that this new middle level of scru-
tiny would be applied to gender classifications. 25 The Court reaf-
firmed the intermediate standard of review for gender classifications
in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,26 where it struck
down the school's women only policy. It is questionable, however,
whether the court will apply the Craig intermediate standard of re-
17. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). In Frontiero, the challenged statute allowed servicemen to claim
their wives as dependents automatically, but servicewomen had to prove their husbands were actually
dependant on them. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 686-87.
20. Id. at 688.
21. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
22. Note, Draft Registration and Gender Discrimination: Constitutional Guarantees of Equal
Protection Fall Prey to Concerns of Military Preparedness Rostker v. Goldberg, 4 Wmrrs L. Rv.
517, 520 n.22 (1982) (citing 429 U.S. at 192).
23. Id.
24. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
25. Comment, Equal Protection and the All-Male Draft Registration - Rostker v. Goldberg,
16 SuirroLK U.L. Ra,. 101, 108 n.25 (1982) (citing 429 U.S. at 210).
26. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
[Vol. 93
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/6
WOMEN IN COMBAT
view to decide the constitutionality of restrictions on women in com-
bat.
The military context of the issue of women in combat may mean
that a lesser standard of scrutiny than the Craig test would be ap-
plied. The Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional claims against
the military has been inconsistent and no explicit guidance as to the
appropriate standard of review has been offered. 27 The Supreme
Court's approach in military cases is often referred to as the "prin-
ciple of deference" ' or the "separate community" doctrine. 29 The
decisions of Congress and military authorities which restrict the con-
stitutional rights of servicemen and servicewomen are given consid-
erable deference. 0
Many dissenting opinions and commentaries have criticized the
separate community approach. 1 One contention is that the approach
is "based on a historically obsolete model of the relation of the
armed forces to society.' '32 Another "criticism is that the majority's
approach . .. does not demonstrate that the judiciary is any less
competent to consider individual rights in a military context than
in connection with prisons, government employment, or national
security. "3
Despite these criticisms, the Supreme Court would most likely
apply the deferential separate community doctrine to a challenge on
exclusion of women from combat. The strongest indication that the
Court would not apply the Craig test in such a case is Justice Rehn-
quist's failure to adopt the test explicitly in Rostker v. Goldberg,4
where there was a constitutional challenge to male-only draft reg-
27. Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 CoLuM. L. REv.
390.
28. Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of
Review?, 17 HorsTRA L. REv. 465 (1989).
29. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 178 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 178-9.
33. Id. at 179.
34. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HALv. L. REv. 17, 164 (1981) [hereinafter
Supreme Court].
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istration policies. In Rostker, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the tests
and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military
context.1 35 A majority of the present Court seems willing to grant
Congress extreme deference in military matters.
III. RosT R V. GOLDBERG: TiE CLOSEST THE COURT HAS COME
TO THE ISSUE
Since 1948 the Military Selective Services Act (MSSA)36 has au-
thorized the President to require males to register for the draft.17
The MSSA does not give the President the power to require the
registration of women.3 In 1980, as a response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, President Carter requested that Congress authorize
funding for the registration of both men and women. 39 The President
wrote, "My decision ... is a recognition of the reality that both
women and men are working members of our society. It confirms
what is already obvious ... that women are now providing all types
of skills in every profession. The military should be no exception." ' 40
Although Congress agreed to the reactivation of draft registration,
they passed a joint resolution appropriating funds for the registra-
tion of men only.41
Reactivation of draft registration revitalized a dormant lawsuit
originally brought in 1971 as a result of the Vietnam conflict. 42 The
case became Rostker v. Goldberg after the substitution of new par-
ties. 43 At issue was whether the MSSA violated the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause by requiring the registration of males
and not females. 4 The plaintiffs, a group of men subject to the
registration, did not challenge specifically the statutes and policies
35. Id. at 164 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981)).
36. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-456, 458-471(a)(1982).
37. Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 162.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Beck, Lord, Howard, Willenson, Kirsch, Morris & Maitland, Women in the Armed Forces,
NEwswEEK, Feb. 18, 1980, at 34 [hereinafter Beck].
41. Comment, supra note 25, at 101.
42. Id. at 102-03.
43. Note, supra note 22, at 519.
44. Id. at 520.
[Vol. 93
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that prohibit females from combat .45 Neither did they concede their
constitutionality, but rather they took the position that whether
women could be excluded from combat was irrelevant for the pur-
poses of their case. 46
A three judge panel of the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the plaintiffs that the
MSSA unconstitutionally discriminated between males and females.47
After applying the Craig test the Court declared that the complete
exclusion of women from registration was not substantially related
to achieving any important government objectives. 4 The district
court's decision came just three days before the registration process
was to begin. 49 Justice Brennan, however, stayed the injunction until
the Supreme Court could review the case in order to avoid confusion
and added costs that would result from the delay. °
After hearing the case, six of the Supreme Court Justices held
that the MSSA exclusion of women from the registration process
did not violate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.5 1 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, repeatedly- alluded
to the great deference given to Congress on military matters. 2 The
Court then, somewhat inconsistently, rejected the Government's ar-
gument that the rational relationship test requiring minimal scrutiny
should be used. 3 Justice Rehnquist further rejected the assumption
that the Craig test should be applied in all gender based discrimi-
nation cases. 54 Stating that any such standards "may all too readily
become facile abstractions used to justify a result," he declined to
be specific about the standard he used in his analysis.5 5 He artic-
ulated the opinion using the language from Craig. Nevertheless, the
45. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 87 (1981).
46. Id. at 87 n.2.
47. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
48. Id.
49. Note, supra note 22, at 520.
50. Id.
51. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
52. Comment, supra note 25, at 111.
53. Note, supra note 22, at 523.
54. Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 164 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67).
55. 453 U.S. at 70.
1991]
7
Snyder: An Equal Right to Fight: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
standard of review that was actually applied "demanded a great deal
less analysis of the appropriateness of means" than the Craig test
called for.5 6
After pointing out that the district court had not been appro-
priately deferential, Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress had given
careful consideration whether to register women for the draft.17 Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, Congress' main purpose for the reg-
istration was to obtain combat troops.18 He then reasoned that
because the law excludes women from participating in combat, men
and women are not "similarly situated" for registration purposes.59
Therefore, requiring only males to register was not a violation of
the Due Process Clause 0
The majority opinion relied on the combat exclusion statutes and
policies as their basis for upholding the male only draft registra-
tion.61 Justice Rehnquist pointed out, "Congress specifically rec-
ognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from combat .... , 62
Apparently, termination of the combat exclusion laws would elim-
inate any basis for exempting women from draft registration since
they would then be "similarly situated." 63
While relying on these combat exclusion policies as the basis for
their decision, the majority never made any reference to their con-
stitutionality.64 Justice Marshall in his dissent, however, does allude
to the constitutionality of excluding women from combat, if only
to point out that these restrictions were not at issue. 65 Justice Mar-
56. Note, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Due Process - of Military Selective
Service Act Authorizing Registration of Males but Not Females, do Not Violate the Fifth Amendment,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 241, 250 (1982).
57. Supreme Court, supra note 34 at 164 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72 (1981)).
58. Id. (citing 453 U.S. at 76).
59. Recent Developments, Constitutional Law Sex Discrimination Gender-Based Draft Regis-
tration, 49 TNN. L. REv. 365, 452 (1982) (citing 453 U.S. at 78).
60. Id.
61. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981).
62. Id. at 76-77.
63. B. Mrrcrm~a, WEAK Lnw: THE FEmNIZATION oF T H Aijamuc MurARy 10 (1989).
64. Id. at 153. The impression given by the majority opinion is that the Court just assumed
that excluding women from combat was constitutionally permissible. Even in Justice White's dissent,
which was joined by Justice Brennan, he stated, "I assume what has not been challenged in this case
- that excluding women from combat positions does not offend the Constitution." 453 U.S. at 83.
65. 453 U.S. at 87, n.2.
[Vol. 93
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shall, in a footnote, stated that the "[a]ppellees do not concede the
constitutional validity of these restrictions on women in combat, but
that they have taken the position that their validity is irrelevant for
purposes of this case." 66 Justice Marshall's language in framing his
argument suggests that he may view the issue as still open to ques-
tion.67
Rostker provides an impediment to a challenge on the consti-
tutionality of statutes and policies restricting women from combat,
but it is not an unsurpassable one. Rostker could be distinguished
by pointing out that the constitutionality of restricting women from
combat was not at issue. The case, however, would likely play a
major role in the Supreme Court's decision on the level of scrutiny
to be applied to the question. The Court would almost assuredly
cite Rostker as solid precedent in support of extreme deference to
Congress in military matters. Therefore, Rostker would be a crucial
element in challenging the ban on women in combat.
IV. APPLYING Tim CRAiG v. BOREN ST axN DS TO COMBAT
EXCLUSION LAWS AND POLICIES
Justice Marshall's dissent in Rostker points out that the analysis
employed by the majority significantly differed from the Craig ap-
proach.68 He warns that "even in the area of military affairs, def-
erence to congressional judgments cannot be allowed to shade into
an abdication of this court's ultimate responsibility to decide con-
stitutional questions.''69 Deference to Congress on military issues is
justified, but not to the extent of upholding laws that violate equal
protection. The courts should apply the true Craig test in a challenge
to the statutes and policies banning women from combat as it does
in other types of gender discrimination cases. Under the Craig test,
such statutes and policies should be declared a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The first step of the Craig test states that gender-based classi-
fications "must serve important governmental objectives." 70 One in-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 93. Justice Marshall's exact wording was "[E]ven assuming that precluding the use
of women in combat is an important governmental interest in its own ight .... ." Id.
68. 453 U.S. at 94.
69. Id. at 89.
70. Note, supra note 22, at 520 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
1991]
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terest the government has in excluding women from combat is to
protect them. In Mississippi University, however, Justice O'Connor
stated in the majority opinion:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or
protect members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.2
Thus, excluding women from combat to protect them is not a gov-
ernmental objective likely to withstand intermediate scrutiny suc-
cessfully.
Furthermore, if the purpose of the exclusion laws is to protect
women from combat, then that purpose fails miserably. As Rep-
resentative Patricia Schroeder, a member of the House Armed Forces
Committee, asserts:
[The Army evaluates the jobs they open to women in terms of their theoretical
proximity to. the battlefield.2 However, the realities of modem warfare, whether
missiles or guerilla tactics, make it difficult to define a field of battle. Military
personnel, regardless of their position, are likely to be exposed to danger ....
While women are barred from assignment to the jobs that are most likely to face
direct combat, they are assigned to support and service support positions that
bring them into the battlefield on a regular basis. 3
For example, women piloted tankers used to fuel fighter planes in
the 1986 air strike on Libya and cargo planes in the invasion of
71. Mississippi Univ. v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
72. Since 1983, the Army has coded [sic] each position according to the Direct Combat
Probability Code (DCPC) or the possibility that the solider would be involved in direct
combat. The assessment is based on the duties of the job specialty, the units mission, tactical
doctrine and battlefield location. Positions with the highest probability are coded PI and
the lowest P7.
Current Army policy prohibits the permanent assignment of women to positions coded
Pl. However, women are not barred from combat support and combat service support
positions that may routinely bring them into the P1 location on the battlefield.
OFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE PATRIcIA SCHROEDER, HousE OF REPREsENTATrvEs, 101sT CONo., 2D SEss.,
FACT SHEEr WOMEN IN CO BAT 2 (Jan. 20, 1990).
73. Experimental Program for Women in Army Combat Units: Hearings on H.R. 3868 Before
the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) [hereinafter Hearings].
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Grenada.74 These slower, less equipped supply planes make an even
more tempting target than the fighters. 75 Thus, if the original pur-
pose of the exclusion laws was to "protect" women, they are ob-
solete in terms of modern warfare.
The government would be able to satisfy the first step of the
Craig test by arguing that the maintenance of an effective national
defense is an important governmental objective.7 6 But the govern-
ment could not meet the second step of the Craig test because the
exclusion of women from combat is not substantially related to
maintaining an effective military force. The nearly unanimous opin-
ion within the military establishment is that "women contribute to,
rather than detract from, military effectiveness." ' 77 The success of
women in all branches of the military confirms this conclusion. 78
Further, a review of the traditional arguments against women serving
in combat will illustrate that these reasons are no longer accurate
or acceptable.
V. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUDING WOMEN FROM
COMBAT AND TIHIR WEAKNESSES
A. Physical Ability
The traditional argument for banning women from combat is
that they do not have the physical ability to perform adequately. 79
74. Lamar, Hallanan and van Voorst, Redefining a Woman's Place, TDO, Feb. 15, 1988, at
27 [hereinafter Lamar].
Women are not allowed to fly fighter planes, but they are free to fly AWAC radar planes
which are so big, slow, and tactically important that they may as well have 'Shoot me first'
stenciled on their sides. Women can't fight in tanks, but they sit in communications trucks
that may be in harm's way. They can't serve on destroyers, but they serve on supply ships
that drop anchor alongside destroyers.
Soldier Boys, Soldier Girls, THE NEw REPuBLic, Feb. 19, 1990, at 7.
75. Lamar, supra note 74, at 27.
76. 453 U.S. at 70 and 88. See also Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of All-
Male Registration, 94 HAmv. L. Rnv. 411 (1980).
77. Note, supra note 76, at 411.
78. Id. at 412.
79. Reed, Women in Combat: A Real Bad Idea, ARMY TmtaS, Jan. 29, 1990, at 62. See also
B. MITcHELL, supra note 63, at 156-62; Tuten, The Argument Against Female Combatants, FEMA E
SOLDIaRS: COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS, 247-51 (N. Goldman ed. 1982).
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Studies by the Pentagon concluded that "[w]omen have only fifty-
five percent the muscle strength and sixty-seven percent the endur-
ance of men."80 Generally, the studies showed that women are
shorter, lighter, and slower than men.8' Brian Mitchell, author of
Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military, argues that
women are not capable of performing critical battle field functions.8 2
For example, the Marines do not allow women to throw live gre-
nades because of the belief that they cannot throw them far enough
to avoid injury.83 The argument is that women's physical differences
make them unsuitable for combat, so they are not "similarly sit-
uated" for equal protection purposes.
Many military personnel, however, are now dismissing such ar-
guments as largely irrelevant.84 As warfare has become more centered
on technology, "intellect has replaced brawn," according to Air
Force General Jeanne Holm.85 The ability to learn sophisticated tech-
nical skills is "replacing simple physical prowess as the prime at-
tribute" of the modern solider.8 6 Measured by this standard, women
are equal to and often better than men.87 As Representative Schroe-
der points out, "[h]ow much muscle does it take to launch an ICBM
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]?" 8 Undeniably, physical stamina
is a fundamental requirement for any soldier, but it should not be
the sole requirement.
A main concern expressed by Mitchell and others is that the only
way women would qualify for combat units such as the infantry is
by lowering the rigorous physical standards of the units which would
lead to a weaker military.89 However, surely no one with even min-
80. Beck, supra note 40, at 36.
81. Id.
82. Fire When Ready, Ma'am, TI E, Jan. 15, 1990, at 29.
83. Id.
84. Beck, supra note 40, at 36.
85. Id.
86. Overselective Service, NEw REPULmC, July 18, 1981, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Beck, supra note 40, at 36.
89. B. MrrcHELL, supra note 63, at 69. Mitchell uses the lowering of the physical requirements
for women at the service academies to support his point that allowing women into combat units would
lead to lower physical standards overall. He admits, however, that the standards for the men were
[Vol. 93
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imal understanding of the physical stamina required by the infantry
in actual combat would advocate for the reduction of physical re-
quirements. 90 While it is true that most women will not qualify for
positions that require extreme physical strength, that is no reason
to ban all women per se. 9' As expressed by Brigadier General Evelyn
Foote, "Never compromise standards. Be sure that anybody in any
MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] can do everything required
in that MOS." 92 Those that can meet the same physical standards
as the men should be allowed to serve in those positions. The reality,
however, is that many of the combat positions now closed to women,
such as flying F-16 fighters and commanding aircraft carriers, do
not require great physical strength.93 Thus, the physical strength ar-
gument for excluding women from these positions simply has no
merit.
As Representative Schroeder stated in hearings before the Sub-
committee on Military Personnel and Compensation, "[s]ome women
can indeed carry as much weight, throw as far and run as fast as
some men, and some women exceed some men in physical strength
and endurance. ' 94 She believes "that the real issue is training," and
not actually lowered, only that there were different requirements for the women. Id. at 71. The
academies are training officers for a variety of positions that will require various amounts of strength.
For actual combat positions more studies need to be done to determine exactly how much and what
type of physical strength is needed for each position. A single set of physical standards could then
be developed for each position that anyone who wished to qualify would be required to pass regardless
of their gender. But see Women in Battle, NATIONAL REvmw, Feb. 5, 1990 at 19.
90. Kelly, The Exclusion of Women From Combat: Withstanding the Challenge, JAG J., Summ.
1984, at 100. Lowering the physical requirements for such units as the infantry would be a disservice
not only to the women who would be unprepared in actual combat, but also to everyone in their
unit. The enemy is not going to grant any concessions for gender, thus the United States Military
should not reduce the physical requirements for those positions where it is essential. There are some
women, however, who are capable of meeting those requirements and should be given the chance to
do so.
91. Canada is one country that abides by this philosophy. Since opening of all combat positions
except submarines to women in 1989, only 10 out of 88 women remained in basic training for the
infantry, and only one has graduated. Soldier Boys, Soldier Girls, supra note 74, at 8.
Although the political pressure to lower the standards may be great, to do so would be a disservice
to the women and men in their units in an actual combat situation. The infantry, however, is only
one combat position. There are many other units that were opened up to women, such as combat
aviation, in which they are doing very well. Suh, Canadian Women at Arms, Ms., June 1989, at 72.
92. Moskos, supra note 1, at 77.
93. 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
94. Hearings, supra note 73.
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that properly trained women will be able to perform effectively in
combat. 95 Military women point out that they are already lifting as
much weight on stateside tugboats as they would on a destroyer or
piloting a fighter. 96 In order to ensure the most efficient military it
would seem logical to select the most capable individuals for the
job - regardless of their gender. 97
B. Men's Response to Women in Combat
An argument also used to uphold the restrictions on women in
combat is that men would instinctively try to protect them. 98 Military
experts fear that this male instinct to protect women might hamper
coed combat units. 99 Additionally, some military experts fear that
the presence of women would interfere with the male camaraderie
they believe is crucial in warfare. 100 As Mitchell argues, "[tihe pres-
ence of women inhibits male bonding, corrupts allegiance to the
hierarchy, and diminishes the desire of men to compete for anything
but the attentions of women."' 0'1 These authorities believe that women
should be excluded from combat because they would have a negative
effect on the men.
The problem with the argument that women must be excluded
from combat because men feel compelled to protect them, is that
it crosses the line from gallantry into chauvinism. The concept of
men as women's protectors "loses its mystique in the face of the
enormous incidence of rape, battering, [and] the portrayal of women
in pornographic materials . . . ,,1o2 The argument that men will be
distracted from their duties by trying to protect the women also
holds little merit when the military is compared to other fields where
men and women work efficiently together. For example, there are
95. Id.
96. Beck, supra note 40, at 39.
97. Note, The Army's Combat Exclusion: An Update, 16 W. ST. L. REv. 665, 671 (1989)
(emphasis added).
98. Beck, supra note 40, at 39.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. B. MITCHELL, supra note 63, at 190.
102. Lieberman, Women in Combat, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. at 215, 220 (May 1990).
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many female policemen who are working everyday with their male
counterparts in combat-like situations. 103 Men have adjusted to
working with women in many dangerous professions such as fire
fighting, coal mining and construction. °4 As the number of women
in the military exceeds the current eleven percent,' 05 men will grow
accustomed to fighting alongside females as they have adjusted to
working alongside them in civilian life.
Additionally, the argument that the presence of women will neg-
atively affect the unit cohesion is of questionable validity. 0 6 Studies
have shown "that the proportion of women in combat support...
units had no effect on measurable unit performance in field training
exercises."' 0 7 Gender integration has already begun to change in-
terpersonal dynamics within military units and those changes would
carry over into combat situations. 08 The cohesion of combat units
derives largely from respect for the capabilities of fellow members
in performing the necessary tasks for survival.1 °9 Mutual respect and
interdependence can develop in mixed gender groups." 0 Therefore,
research efforts should be focused on understanding the conditions
that promote the development of such cohesion."'
103. See Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men's World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 LAW AND
INEQUALITY 423 (1984).
104. Lieberman, supra note 102, at 220.
105. Fire When Ready, Ma'am, supra note 82, at 29.
106. As Mary Segal points out:
The concern that women in combat units will reduce unit cohesion is reminiscent of ar-
guments that have been used in the past to justify excluding women from other occupations.
It was not long ago that women were excluded from law, medicine, police work, and fire
fighting .... This exclusion was based partly on ... the potential disruption of men's
interpersonal relations if women were included .... [S]uch arguments ... have now been
shown to be fallacious.
Segal, The Argument for Female Combatants, FEMALE SoLDmas: COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS
279 (N. Goldman ed. 1982).
107. Id. at 278.
108. Id. at 279.
109. Id. at 280.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 281. The most practical way to study the effect of women on combat units would
be to pass Representative Schroeder's legislation calling for a four year experiment where women are
allowed to serve in Army combat units. See infra section VII. The December 1989, invasion of Panama,
however, provides the most convincing evidence to date that women and men can work together
effectively in combat. See infra section VI, D.
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C. Prisoners of War
Another argument often cited as a justification for excluding
women from combat is the treatment they would receive upon be-
coming prisoners of war. 112 The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 provides specific
regulations for the treatment of women prisoners.11 3 Prior experience
has shown that many countries often ignore these international re-
gulations, 1 4 so it must be assumed that captured military women
will be subjected to "cruel and inhuman" treatment."5 That as-
sumption then leads to concerns about national security, pregnancy
and sexual assault.
Some are concerned that women prisoners of war would create
a serious threat to national security." 6 The basis of this argument
is the belief that women would not be able to resist enemy inter-
rogation and exploitation." 7 United States Air Force training ex-
periences, however, have shown that women are "very adept at
112. Dillingham, The Possibility of American Military Women Becoming Prisoners of War:
Justification for Combat Exclusion Rules?, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 223 (May 1990).
Wayne Dillingham is a Major in the United States Air Force and an Assistant Professor of Law
at the United States Air Force Academy. Id. His article provides in-depth discussion on many issues
surrounding the concern over women as prisoners of war. He states his position on women in combat
as follows:
American military women are human beings with a free will .... I believe that when that
free will is informed by reason, those women who chose to expose themselves to the risk
of capture should be treated with dignity and allowed to make that choice. Our current
combat exclusion rules, however, deny American military women that freedom of choice.
Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 224. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Article
14, paragraph 2 provides: "Women shall be treated with all regard due to their sex and shall in all
cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that granted to men." Id. Commentaries on this provision
explain that due regard means that the following points should be considered: "(a) weakness; (b)
honour and modesty; [and] (c) pregnancy and childbirth." Id. See also D. SCENDLER & J. JAMAN,
THE LAws oF ARmED CoNFLicTs 342 (1988).
114. Id. at 225.
115. Id. American women have been prisoners of war in the past. "During World War II, for
example, eleven Navy nurses and sixty-six Army nurses were captured by the Japanese in the Phi-
lippines and held prisoner for thirty-seven months." Id. at 224. Although the nurses were required
to perform camp labor such as laundry and cleaning, and suffered from malnourishment, they were
not subjected to physical abuse. Id. It is unlikely, however, that American military women would
receive similar treatments as these non-combatants. Id.
116. Id. at 225.
117. Id.
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resistance techniques - perhaps even better than their male coun-
terparts. '"118 Also, many believe that there would be situations in
which the male prisoners would be more willing to cooperate with
the enemy in order to protect the women." 9 The way to guard against
this possibility is through more psychological training in programs
such as the Resistance Training Laboratory at the United States Air
Force Academy.120 The programs should include preparation for the
possibility that female soldiers may be abused in order to weaken
the male soldiers' resistance.
Additionally, when considering women as prisoners of war, the
issue of pregnancy arises, whether from rape or relations with an-
other prisoner. 2 1 The possibility of such pregnancies, however, is
remote from a medical perspective. 22 "Given the extreme stress and
poor diet generally associated with the prisoner of war environment,
most if not all of these women will likely experience amenorrhea
(absence of menses) and, therefore, the likelihood of pregnancies
will be decreased."'12 The essence of this argument is that all women
should be excluded from combat because some of them may be
captured, and a fraction of that number might become pregnant.
Such a justification for the exclusion of all women from combat is
overinclusive and unconstitutionally broad.
Another concern expressed is that women prisoners of war will
be sexually abused. 24 "Women are as likely as men to be taken
prisoners of war, and although no form of torture can be dismissed,
women would certainly be more vulnerable to . . . rape.' 2 5 While
118. Id. at 227. The Air Force's high stress training program takes place at the Air Force Acad-
emy during the summer. Major Dillingham was one of the Officers-in-Charge of the Resistance Train-
ing Laboratory, and his conclusions are based on his own observations and from discussions with
others on the staff. He states that while the training program is not actual captivity, it should at
least provide some insights into the performance of women under such conditions. Id.
119. Id. at 227-28.
120. Id. at 227.
121. Id. at 226.
122. Id.
123. Id. Amenorrhea is common among women athletes, dancers and among female cadets in
the high stress atmosphere of the service academies. Amenorrhea substantially reduces-the chance of
women becoming pregnant after capture, even if held for a long period of time. Id.
124. Salter, Annie Don't Get Your Gun, ATLANTc, June 1980 at 84.
125. Id.
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the ordeal of sexual assault cannot be disregarded, the experience
must be looked at in the whole context of a war. Wars are terri-
fyingly violent situations. While the image of the enemy assaulting
a female soldier is appalling, the impact of that image lessens when
compared with other horrors of war such as the massacre of whole
villages or the bombing of entire cities. When considered among
other hideous events that occur during wars, sexual assault becomes
a lesser evil. Moreover, in peacetime the rape of a woman occurs
every three and a half minutes.2 6Therefore, excluding women from
combat will not ensure their safety from sexual assault.
Furthermore, to exclude women from combat because of their
vulnerability to sexual assault merely serves to perpetuate the idea
that rape is the worst thing that can happen to a woman. While
the emotional and physical trauma of sexual assault should never
be dismissed lightly, it is survivable, unlike many things in war. Also,
excluding women from combat because of their vulnerability to sex-
ual assault merely enhances their susceptibility to such occurrences
in society overall.127 In Rostker v. Goldberg, the National Organi-
zation of Women (NOW) and several other women's groups filed
amicus briefs. 2 8 NOW argued that "[e]xclusion of women from the
draft injures their self perception, reinforces the stereotypes of women
as weak and men as aggressive, and helps to perpetuate the con-
ditions under which ... men are lead to believe that it is normal
to assault women. 1 129 Thus, the possibility of sexual assault does
not justify the exclusion of women from combat.
D. Pregnancy
There is also anxiety that fraternization among the troops would
be impossible to prevent, which would result in pregnant soldiers. 30
Brian Mitchell states in his book Weak Link that seven to seventeen
percent of the females in the military service are pregnant each year. 3'
126. Hearings, supra note 73.
127. Kalber, Combat in the Errdneous Zone, NATION, July 25, 1981 at 73.
128. Id..
129. Id.
130. Tuten, supra note 79, at 251.
131. B. MrrcHIELL, supra note 63, at 166.
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Regulations require evacuation of pregnant women from remote in-
stallations with limited medical facilities and restricts them from sea
duty. 132 The argument is that since women can become pregnant,
they are not "similarly situated" for equal protection purposes on
the issue of combat.
Undoubtedly, pregnancy would be a problem in combat situa-
tions, but not an insurmountable one. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act requires employers to treat women affected by pregnancy in the
same manner as other employees for employment related purposes,
although there is still some question whether this Act applies to the
uniformed military. 133 A woman unable to perform her duties be-
cause of pregnancy must be treated in the same manner as any other
employee with a temporary disability.' 34 Excluding women from
combat because they may be temporarily unable to fulfill their duties
violates the purpose of this Act. The military adjusted its policies
to the reality of pregnancy in peacetime and the Pentagon modified
the regulations so that pregnancy is no longer grounds for com-
pulsory discharge. 135 Instead, new mothers are eligible for up to six
weeks paid postpartum leave. 3 6 They also have the option of being
discharged if they prefer. 137
The wide range of individual differences between women in re-
gards to what they can and cannot do while pregnant and the wide
range of combat positions must be considered. 3 8 Some women are
capable of strenuous activity in the early months of pregnancy. 3 9
One young female Marine even completed the strenuous officer-
132. Id. at 169.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). This act was part of the Equal Employment Opportunities
Act of 1972 which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit gender discrimination.
In 1972, Congress also amended Title VII to cover employees "in military departments as defined
in section 102 of title 5." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982). Section 102 provides that 'military de-
partments' are the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The
majority of the courts thus far have held that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military.
See infra section VI, B.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
135. Beck, supra note 40, at 41.
136. Id. See also B. MrrcHELL, supra note 63, at 169.
137. B. MITCHELL, supra note 63, at 166.
138. Segal, supra note 106, at 272.
139. Id.
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candidate school at Quantico, Virginia, while she was six months
pregnant./n° Important also is the reality that persons assigned to
combat positions do not spend the majority of their time in combat,
thereby reducing the amount to which pregnancy would interfere
with job performance. 41 When job performance is interfered with,
contingency plans must be made to reassign pregnant women, as is
done with other conditions that require the reassignment of per-
sonnel.142
Charles Moskos points out that the miserable field conditions
existing during combat would go a long way towards discouraging
eroticism. 43 The rapid advances in birth control would also prevent
many pregnancies in combat situations.'44 Still, there will be some
female soldiers who become pregnant, and that must be an accepted
phenomena to having women in combat. The possibility that some
women will become pregnant is not so great a burden, however,
that it justifies the exclusion of all women from combat. Such ov-
erinclusive policies are unconstitutionally broad.
E. Family Life
Many authorities also express concern about the strains that al-
lowing women in combat would create on family life. 41 In an amicus
brief filed in support of the Justice Department's position in Rostker
140. Beck, supra note 40, at 42.
141. Segal, supra note 106, at 273.
142. Id. at 272.
143. Moskos, Female GIs in the Field, SociEmY, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 31 [hereinafter Female GIs
in the Field].
Moskos, a professor of sociology at Northwestern University, interviewed 48 female soldiers who
were taking part in a military exercise in Honduras called Granadero I. Id. at 28. Some of the field
conditions he described included a desolate camp, oppressive heat, dust storms, heavy rain, outdoor
latrines, field showers and a strict dress code. Id. at 29. While stating there was undoubtedly some
sexual relations between the soldiers in the field, he believes that the amount was fairly low and that
there was much less opportunity for such activities than on stateside bases. Id. at 31.
Major Dillingham also points out that "[w]hen one's very survival is threatened, sex is not
necessarily one's highest priority." Dillingham, supra note 112, at 228.
144. Amenorrhea (absence of menses) may also reduce the possibility of pregnancy in high stress-
combat situations. See infra section V, at C (discussion of amenorrhea).
145. See Draft Women?: The Arguments For and Against, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April
6, 1081, at 31; Notes and Comments, NEw YORKER, Feb. 25, 1980, at 31; Salter, supra note 124,
at 84; Segal.
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v. Goldberg, sixteen women argued that "[t]he potential absence of
a mother from a home is ... more likely to be disruptive than the
potential absence of a father.' '146 To send women off to war "would
leave the home deserted" and "empty out the heart of the com-
munity."' 147 The argument is that women are the traditional home-
makers and caretakers and to send them into combat would
undermine the basis of the family.
The fallacy in the argument that the potential absence of the
mother would be devastating to the family is that it is based on
traditional stereotyped images of family life in America. Changes
in family structure have made it impossible to define a "typical"
American family. 148 Economic necessity has already caused mothers
in many families to be absent from the home. 149 "[B]y 1978, more
than half (58 percent) of all American mothers of school-age children
were in the labor force."' 150 Once the child is no longer physically
dependant on the mother, no justification remains for distinguishing
between the responsibilities of the mother and father. 151 An argument
could be made that the emotional bond between the mother and
child is stronger than that between the father and child. 52 Never-
theless, as fathers assume greater child-rearing roles, the circum-
stances may shift to create stronger emotional bonds between the
father and child.Y3
The easiest solution to the perceived potential problem would be
to ban women with children from combat. However, that solution
would only serve to perpetuate the traditional stereotypes of women
as the caretakers, since men with children are not subject to similar
146. Draft Women?: The Arguments For and Against, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, supra
note 145.
147. Notes and Comments, NEw YORKER supra note 145, at 31.
148. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEw, March 1990,
at 4-13. See also Empty Nests in More Family Trees, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 7, 1988,
at 97; Measures of Change, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 25, 1989, at 66-67; Melton and
Wilcox, Changes in Family Law and Family Lives, AmERicAN PSYCHOLOGIST, Sept. 1989, at 1213-16;
Weitzman, Changing Famililes, Changing Laws, FAmmY ADVOCATE, Summ. 1982, 2-7.
149. Weitzman, supra note 148, at 7.
150. Id.
151. Salter, supra note 124, at 84.
152. See Segal, supra note 106, at 274.
153. Lieberman, supra note 102, at 219.
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restrictions. If combat duty becomes available to women, steps could
be taken to ensure children's care in the event of their mothers'
injury or death.54 For example, the Army requires single parents to
sign a statement that they have appointed a legal guardian for their
children in case of their mobilization or death. 15 The reality is "that
the problem of child care is not applicable to all women," since
not all women have children.15 6 Furthermore, the problem is not
unique to women, since it also applies to a growing number of single
fathers in the military.15 7
F. Public Opinion
Questions are often raised about the American public's willing-
ness to accept the inevitable consequence of female casualties if
women participate in direct combat. 58 The argument is that the
"image of a female soldier being brought home in a body bag is
somehow more hideous than that of a male soldier. However, it is
hard for anyone to argue that a women's life is more sacred than
a man's."' 159 As Lieutenant Roberta Spillane comments about the
American public: "[w]hen children die, it hurts, regardless of the
gender. So if they're not ready for their daughters to be killed in
combat protecting this country, they'd better reconsider just how
ready they are that their sons are doing it."' 16 Further, the women
who join the military are aware of the possible consequences. When
asked whether the American public would accept female casualties,
First Lieutenant Kimberly Warren responded, "I'm not sure the
American public is ready to see that. But the women that are pos-
sibly going to come home in those body bags are ready for that.''
While the argument has been made that the American public
does not want women serving in combat, 6 2 the latest opinion polls
154. Segal, supra note 106, at 274.
155. Beck, supra note 40, at 42. See also Segal, supra note 106, at 274; B. MITCHELL, supra
note 63 at 172.
156. Segal, supra note 106, at 274.
157. Id.
158. 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
159. Salter, supra note 124, at 85.
160. 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
161. Id.
162. Kelly, supra note 90, at 106.
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show that most Americans support the proposal of women in com-
bat.163 "In a 1982 poll, taken by the National Opinion Research
Center, 84 percent of the American public supported keeping or
increasing the proportion of women in the services, and 62 percent
were in favor of allowing women to be fighter pilots."' 164 A New
York Times/CBS News report in January 1990, stated that 72 per-
cent of Americans believed that women who wanted to serve in
combat units should be allowed to do So.165 Therefore, the laws and
policies excluding women from combat are contrary to the will of
the majority of the American public.
G. Survival of the Species
An additional argument against women in combat is that "pro-
tecting women from combat is a way of ensuring the survival of
the species," since women are the child bearers. 166 The theory is that
since a few men can impregnate many women, more young women
than men must survive a war to ensure the continuation of the Amer-
ican society.167 The flaw in this argument is that at its base is the
assumption that one man will impregnate several females. This "sur-
vival of the species" argument fails to consider American cultural
values and norms.168 While alternative lifestyles are becoming more
common, the overwhelming norm in the American society is still
monogamous marital relationships. 69 If our society is to continue
with its social and cultural values intact, as many young men will
need to survive a war as young women. 70
While the argument could be made that a woman's child bearing
years would coincide with the years she would be most likely to
163. B. MrrcHELL, supra note 63, at 153.
164. Hearings, supra note 73.
165. Id. Also, "A survey of 556 military women conducted in April 1989 resulted almost two
to one in favor of repealing rules excluding women from combat." Lieberman, supra note 102, at
219 (citing Mitchell, Women Don't Belong in the Military, NAVY TRAES, July 3, 1989).
166. Segal, supra note 106, at 281 (citing Gilder, The Case Against Women in Combat, NEw
YoRK Tuams MAGAZINE, Jan. 28, 1979, at 29).
167. Segal, supra note 106, at 281.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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serve in combat, many women today are starting families much
later.17' "Furthermore, the health risks of women bearing children
when they are relatively older (that is, twenty-five to forty years of
age) have been substantially reduced through a variety of medical
developments.' 172 It seems doubtful that authorizing women to serve
in combat will endanger the survival of the American society more
than any previous war.
This review of the traditional arguments raised in defense of
excluding women in combat illustrates that they are either invalid
or based on unacceptable, outdated stereotypes. These reasons fail
to show that restrictions on women in combat substantially relate
to maintaining an effective military force or to any other important
governmental interest. Therefore, the restrictions fail the second part
of the Craig test.
VI. ADDITIONAL REASONS TO REPEAL THE STATUTES OR DECLARE
THEM UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Job Restrictions
The number of positions from which the military excludes women
varies from eighty percent in the Marine Corps to four percent in
the Air Force. '71 Overall, the combat exclusion laws and policies
restrict women from thirty-nine percent of the total positions in the
Department of Defense. 174 The combat exclusion laws even close off
job opportunities to women that do not involve combat. 75 The mil-
itary functions on a rotation basis, whereby men can be rotated out
of "combat-ready" posts when needed. 176 As a result there are limits
on the numbers of women who can be accepted into the military
for even clerical and administrative jobs. 77 "Military statistics show
171. Id. at 281-82.
172. Id. at 282.
173. U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 1, at v.
174. Id.
175. Beck, supra note 40, at 39. See also Landers, Should Women be Allowed Into Combat?,
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, Oct. 13, 1989 at 578.
176. Beck, supra note 40, at 39.
177. Id.
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that female volunteers . . . are easier to recruit, more mature, better
educated, more quickly promoted, more inclined to re-enlist, and
less inclined to have drug or disciplinary problems than their male
counterparts. 1 7 8 Yet despite manpower shortages, the limits set on
the number of women that can be accepted are forcing recruiters
to turn away qualified women.1 79 Therefore, the combat exclusion
laws result in some women being completely restricted from the mil-
itary.
The laws and regulations banning women from combat not only
restrict them from the military completely because of the rotation
system, but also deprive them of promotions.18 0 Promotions nor-
mally require officer experience in a major command 8' or extensive
sea or flight experience.8 z Because women lack experience in combat
positions, the exclusion laws and policies are keeping women out
of top military posts.183 These combat restrictions severely limit the
careers of women who join the military.
The laws and policies excluding women from combat violate the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying women their
fundamental right to engage and advance in their chosen occupation.
The statutes and policies intentionally discriminate against women
as a class. The explicit basis of the classifications is gender and the
statistics cited above show the discriminatory effect that the statutes
have had in denying women promotions and employment.
B. Title VII
Restrictions that exclude women from combat are not only un-
constitutional, but they may also violate Title VII of the Civil Rights
178. Overselective Service, supra note 86, at 6.
179. Beck, supra note 40, at 40.
In 1988, the court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that excluding women from
enlistment who have only a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, while accepting males
with GEDs, is reasonably relevant and necessary to national defense, given the policy that excludes
women from combat. Lewis v. United States Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
180. Beck, supra note 40, at 39.
181. Lamar, supra note 74, at 27.
182. Beck, supra note 40, at 39.
183. Lamar, supra note 74, at 27.
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Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act (EEOA) of 1972.184 The EEOA added the term "sex" to the
list of traits that employers may not use to discriminate for em-
ployment purposes.' 85 Congress also amended Title VII in 1972 to
include "military departments. ' 186 Whether Title VII applies to the
uniformed military, however, is not yet settled. Until recently, fed-
eral district courts consistently held that Title VII does not protect
uniformed members of the military. 187 Nevertheless, in a recent sex
discrimination suit, Hill v. Berkman, the court of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York held that Title VII protection does extend to
uniformed members of the armed forces,'88 but does not nullify the
combat exclusion laws.
Joan Hill enlisted in the Army in 1982 after receiving an express
promise that she would be trained as a Nuclear Biologist and Chem-
ist (NBC).189 After she gave up her job and passed the requisite
scholastic and medical exams, the Army classified NBC as a "com-
bat support role," and closed it to women.1 9 Although she obtained
an honorable discharge, she did not receive the papers until more
than a year later, making it difficult to find employment. 19' In 1983,
the Army reassessed the NBC position and declared that it could
accommodate more women without being a threat to combat read-
iness. 92 Ms. Hill brought an action alleging that the Army discrim-
inated against her because of her gender. 93
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988).
185. Id.
186. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1228, 1232-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Act of March 24,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1972)).
187. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1233 (citing to Roper v. Dep't of Army, 832 F.2d 247,
248 (2d Cir. 1987); Cobb v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, 592 F. Supp. 640, 642 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); Gonzalez v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 927-29 (9th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653
F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd
sub nom.; Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986
(1978).
See Note, The Army's Combat Exclusion: An Update, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 665, 682-84 (1989)
(analysis of these cases).
188. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
189. Id. at 1231.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1232.
193. Id. at 1230.
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Judge Weinstein began by pointing out that the 1972 amendment
to Title VII made it applicable to "employees or applicants for em-
ployment ... in military departments as defined in section 102 of
title 5 .... ,,194 Section 102 defines military departments as "The
Department of the Army, The Department of the Navy, [and] The
Department of the Air Force.' 1 95 He observes that there are no
further explanations of these terms given and that "on their face
these provisions include the armed forces. "196 According to the leg-
islative materials, the 1972 amendments should be applied broadly. 97
Also, "[w]hen Congress wanted to distinguish between uniformed
and civilian employees of the military, it did so explicitly," such as
in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 198
Judge Weinstein contended that Title VII is the sole judicial rem-
edy for members of the uniformed military with sex discrimination
claims. 199 He stated, "[m]embers of the armed forces are federal
employees who share in all Americans' constitutional right to equal
protection under the law. There is nothing in Title VII to suggest
that the uniformed military are an exception to 'members of military
departments' expressly covered under § 2000e-16." 2°° Therefore, Ti-
tle VII applied in Joan Hill's case even though she had been a
member of the uniformed military.
The court then declared that the only way to reconcile Title VII
and the statutes banning women in combat is if the statutes fit under
one of the exceptions to Title VIIA2' One exception is the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) that allows distinctions based on
sex if "a reasonable good faith and justifiable ground ex-
ists .... -202 The court held that Title VII does not nullify the fed-
194. Id. at 1232 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1972).
195. Id. at 1233 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 102).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1234.
198. Id. at 1235. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
199. Id. at 1238.
200. Id. This line of reasoning has been explicitly rejected by other courts. See Roper v. De-
partment of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 718, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965)).
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eral statutes and policies banning women from combat. 2 3 Therefore,
"because combat risk is an occupational qualification mandated by
statute, it is an appropriate BFOQ exception to Title VII. ' ' 204 The
basis for the decision was deference to Congress and belief that most
American people support the restrictions on women in combat. 205
For, as Justice Weinstein stated, the court had not found any pre-
vious cases challenging the exclusion statutes. 20 6
The court in Hill seemed to say that the only basis for excluding
women from combat is that no one has challenged the statutory
combat restrictions. The time has come for such a direct challenge
to these laws. The standards for establishing gender discrimination
are different under Title VII than under the Due Process Clause
where intent must be shown. 20 Under Title VII proof of intent is
unnecessary and discriminatory impact alone is sufficient to establish
a violation.0 8
The exclusion of women from thirty-nine percent of the total
positions in the Department of Defense2°9 illustrates that the combat
restrictions have had a negative impact on employment of women
in the military. The appropriate congressionally-mandated standard
in a Title VII case is whether the classification is a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to normal operation
of that particular business .... ",210 As indicated in the review of
traditional arguments against women in combat, gender does not
determine who can perform capably as a solider. Therefore, being
a male should not be a bona fide occupational qualification for
military combat. As long as the statutes excluding women from com-
bat endure, however, being male is apt to remain a BFOQ, and the
courts are unlikely to rule that the restrictions violate Title VII.
203. Id. at 1239-40.
204. Id. at 1240.
205. Id. at 1238.
206. Id.
207. Zichy v. Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
208. Id. at 346.
209. U.S. DEaPm ,rr oF DmNsE, supra note 1, at V.
210. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765, 770 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd 522 F.2d 850
(6th Cir. 1975).
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C. International Image
Other countries around the world do not find the idea of women
in combat shocking. In Rostker v. Goldberg, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that "[n]o major country has women in combat jobs
in their standing army. ' 211 That statement is no longer true. In 1989,
Canada accepted women in all combat forces except on submar-
ines.212 Canada is the fifth NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation] country to employ women in combat positions along with
Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway213 and Denmark. 214 Sweden also
dropped its ban on women in combat in 1989.215 The number of
women joining the military rose sharply in Australia when they be-
came eligible for most combat positions in May 1990.216 Although
rigorous physical tests still keep many women out of the infantry,
these countries allow women to serve in most combat positions. 217
With more categories of military jobs becoming open to women in
the United States, "combat duty is the last hurdle. ' 218 Americans
must show that they believe in the idea of equal rights themselves
if the United States is to continue as a leader for equality in the
world.
D. The Panama Invasion
The United States' invasion of Panama in December 1989, known
as "Operation Just Cause," provided tangible proof that women
are capable of performing well in combat.219 During the invasion,
174 women in Army military police and combat support units fought
snipers and provided security.2m Women commanded two of the
211. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 n.12 (1981).
212. A Fresh Shot at Full Equality, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD RP., 12 Jan. 15, 1990 at 12.
213. Suh, supra note 91, at 71.
214. Soldier Boys, Soldier Girls, supra note 74, at 8.
215. A Fresh Shot at Full Equality, supra note 212, at 12.
216. Women in Australia's Military, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1990, A10, col. 3.
217. A Fresh Shot at Full Equality, supra note 212, at 12.
218. Id.
219. See Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama, MInmRvA's BuLLEn BoARD, Spring
1990, at 3; McCullough, Company Commander Reports from Panama, MnERvA's BULLMn BoARD,
Spring 1990, at 1. But see Fire When Ready Ma'am, supra note 82, at 29.
220. Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama, supra note 219, at 3.
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Army Military Police units. 22' One of those units, commanded by
Captain Linda Bray, came under enemy fire at a Panamanian guard
dog kennel.tm Two other women piloting "UH-60 'Blackhawk' hel-
icopters came under heavy fire as they shuttled soldiers into combat
during early hours of the invasion." 3 Several rounds of fire struck
Warrant Officer Debra Mann's helicopter damaging it so badly it
had to be grounded.22 In all, almost 800 women took part in the
Panama operation, becoming the first American women to engage
hostile troops in modern combat.2
Operation Just Cause also provided at least one example of the
senseless results of the combat exclusion laws. Sergeant Rhonda J.
Maskus is a paratrooper and intelligence analyst stationed at Fort
Bragg. 6 She specialized in Panamanian intelligence for two years
and spent three months working on the invasion plans.227 However,
when officials requested an intelligence analyst from her section, the
officers in command sent male soldiers with no special expertise on
Panama in her place.m Incidents of this type serve not only to per-
petuate the inferior status of women but also hinder the country's
221. McCullough, supra note 219, at 1.
222. Fire When Ready Ma'am, supra note 82, at 29.
There were many conflicting reports as to what actually took place during this incident. Nev-
ertheless, Captain "Bray and four other women from her 988th Military Police Company were nom-
inated for the Army Commendation Medal." Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama,
supra note 219, at 3.
223. Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama, supra note 219, at 3. "Lieutenant Lisa
Kutschera and Warrent Officer Debra Mann were recommended for the Air Medal with a 'V' for
valor. They would be the first women to receive this decoration with the valor designation." Id.
224. Id.
225. Moskos, Army Women, supra note 1, at 72.
"The Army insisted that none of their activities violated Army policy barring women from combat
as that policy is currently defined." The exact number of women taking place in the operation is
unknown because the Air Force cre%' manifest lists only the last names and initials and not their
gender. It is known that several Air Force women were involved in the invasion including eighteen
deployed with the Strategic Air Command who participated in a refueling mission over the water
whose actual proximity to the fighting is classified. Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama,
supra note 219 at 3.
226. Female Sergeant Charges Discrimination in Panama Orders, MINERVA's BULLETIN BOARD,
Spring 1990 at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id. "Maskus filed a complaint with the Fort Bragg Equal Opportunity Office on January
10, [1990] charging that failure to send her to Panama during the U.S. invasion constituted sex
discrimination." Id. at 3-4. 30
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military effectiveness. In times of crisis the person most qualified
for the job is the one to send, regardless of gender.
Now that women have successfully engaged in combat, the rea-
sons for maintaining the restrictions become even less convincing.
Nevertheless, Brian Mitchell, author of Weak Link 29 argues that the
use of female soldiers in Panama proved nothing because "[t]he
sorts of things they were doing could'be done by a twelve-year-old
with a rifle."230 His argument seems rather weak though, since it is
hard to imagine twelve-year-olds piloting helicopters and driving
trucks to transport trool~s under enemy fire. The invasion proved
that women not only can survive combat, but can be substantial
contributors to its success.
E. Operation Desert Storm
The United States is currently engaged in a military conflict with
Iraq as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.231
The government has classified the exact number of women who are
or will be taking part in the Operation,2 32 but a Cable News Network
(CNN) report estimated that over 27,500 United States military
women are in the Persian Gulf area.23 Never before have women
served in such large numbers or in such a wide variety of positions
in a major military operation234 The women are serving as pilots,
mechanics, truck drivers, intelligence specialists, paratroopers, flight
controllers, shipboard navigators, communications experts and in
many other crucial posts. 235
Operation Desert Storm illustrates the hypocrisy of the combat
exclusion policies. 6 Before the fighting began, the Pentagon told
reporters that should active hostilities commence against Iraq, chances
229. B. Mrrciaui, supra note 63.
230. Fire When Ready Ma'am, supra note 82, at 29.
231. Iraq Tramples Kuwait, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 2, 1990 at 1, col. 5.
232. Beck, Wilkinson, Turque and Bingham, Our Women in the Desert, NEwswEEK, Sept. 10,
1990 at 22 [hereinafter Beck & Wilkinson].
233. Cable News Network (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 19, 1991).
234. Beck & Wilkinson, supra note 230, at 22.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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were that the women sent to Saudi Arabia with their units would
come under fire. 2 7 Iraq has not yet utilized chemical weapons but
there is little doubt that if they do, military women will be among
the casualties. 238 These women are training men for missions they
themselves are not permitted to carry out, commanding units in
which they cannot serve and are working along side the men under
hostile fire without being classified as serving in direct combat. 239
The Kuwait crisis could prove to be the final factor in deter-
mining the fate of the combat exclusion laws and policies. As the
authors of one Newsweek article stated:
[Women, more than the men, believe their future in the armed forces is on the
line that George Bush has drawn in the sand. If a major war erupts, spreading
unisex casualties throughout the theater, it could finally bring down the combat
exclusions or it could so outrage the American public, and its leaders, that women
are never again placed so close to the action in so many critical rolesY0
Although the fighting has just begun, Operation Desert Storm has
already undoubtedly provided significant insights into the impor-
tance of women in the United States Armed Forces.
VII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE MAY BE TH MOST SUCCESSFUL MEANS
OF ELIMINATING THE COMBAT ExcLusIoNs
There are strong equal protection and Title VII arguments against
the combat exclusion laws. Given, however, the judiciary's tradi-
tional deference to Congress on military issues, 241 there seems to be
little chance at present that the courts would declare the exclusion
laws and polices to be unconstitutional or in violation of Title VII.
Therefore, efforts to change these discriminatory policies will be
most successful if focused on Congress.
One of the main arguments for upholding the combat exclusion
laws is that there are too many unknowns about the abilities of
women in combat situations and the effect of their presence .2 2 While
237. 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
238. Beck & Wilkinson, supra note 232, at 22.
239. Id. at 23.
240. Id. at 25.
241. See Note, supra note 28, at 475.
242. Kelly, supra note 90, at 99-101.
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it is true that training is not the same as actual combat, an exper-
imental program allowing women to serve in combat units in the
United States would tell us more than we know now. 243 Some au-
thorities speculate that the program would establish that some women
have the physical and psychological endurance to perform well in
combat.2 4 Such a result would make the pressure to remove the ban
on women in combat difficult to resist2 45
In 1987, Canada began an experimental program called CREW
(Combat Related Employment of Women) trials. 46 The CREW trials
were "a five-year empirical study of mixed gender combat groups
in the army and navy.'"'47 A ruling by the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal that all combat positions must be opened to women cut
the tests short.248 During the two year existence of the trials, how-
ever, 41 women made it to combat positions in the army and navy.249
In January, 1990, Representative Schroeder introduced House
Report 3868, which called for "a four-year test program to examine
the implications of the removal of limitations on the assignment of
female members of the Army to combat and combat-support po-
sitions."' 50 The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Serv-
ices (DACOWITS) proposed a similar program in 1989.251 In April
1990, however, the Army announced that it would not activate such
a program.252 Passage of a bill such as Representative Schroeder's
is the only way to establish such an experimental program since the
Army has declined to do so voluntarily. Although H.R. Rep. 3868
died in committee there are plans for its reintroduction. 253 An ex-
perimental program which will allow women in combat, however,
243. Moskos, supra note 1, at 78.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Suh, supra note 91, at 71.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 72. The number of women overall who were involved in the program and what
positions they obtained was not available in this source.
250. H.R. Doc. No. 3868, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
251. Moskos, supra note 1, at 78.
252. Id.
253. Telephone interview with unidentified staff member in Representative Patricia Schroeder's
Washington D.C. office (Jan. 2, 1991).
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will meet with tough opposition in Congress and thus must receive
strong support from the public if it is to pass.2 14
VIII. CoNcLUSION
For all the reasons discussed in this Note, the statutes and policies
restricting women from combat should be repealed by Congress or
declared unconstitutional. The restrictions violate the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and Title VII by purposely discriminating
against women. The traditional reasons given for the exclusion of
women from combat are outdated and inaccurate. There is no sub-
stantial relationship between the restrictions and any important gov-
ernmental objective. Thus, the statutes and policies fail to meet the
standards set forth in the Craig test.
The military should not lower standards for combat readiness,
nor should women receive special treatment. Neither, however, should
the United States government ban women per se from the chance
to achieve those standards merely because of gender. Arbitrarily
banning qualified women from positions they are capable of per-
forming harms not only military effectiveness, but also the quality
of the American society as well. Until women obtain the opportunity
to assume their equal share of societal obligations they will never
achieve equal rights as citizens.
Kathy L. Snyder*
254. See Moskos, supra note 1, at 78.
* The author would like to thank fellow law student First Lieutenant Caitlin J. Porter, United
States Army, for sharing her own experiences as a woman in the modem military.
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